إلعب غيرها أيها اليورو .. !

[Neil]

ألا ترون معي كأن اليورو يعيد نفس سيناريو الذي استهل به عام 2004 ؟؟

أي :

كان نهاية عام 2003 ارتفاع شديد ....

بداية عام 2004 أسيوع من الانخفاض التصحيحي القوي

ثم ارتفع مجدداً و عمل دبل توب ...

بعد ذلك البدء بانخفاض اليورو و التصحيح الأكبر حتى لامس الترند لاين الأساسي الصاعد

أما الآن .... فقد انتهى 2004 بنفس الطريقة التي انتهى بها 2003

بدأ 2005 بنفس الطريقة التي بدأ بها 2004

أي أسبوع تصحيحي قوي جداً من الواضح أن يليه ارتداد نحو الأعلى ..

فهل السيناريو نفسه يعاد ..؟؟

[ابو حســام]

لقطه حلوه اخي الكريم .. وصوره اكثر من رائعه

اذكر ان بعض الاخوان قد تحدثوا قبل فتره عن دورات سعريه .. انا شخصيا لا اعرفها لذلك لن افتيك عنها .. ولكن اختصارها .. هي ان سيناريو حركة السعر يتكرر من فتره لاخرى .. بل لديهم جداول لهذه الدورات السعريه .. بالضبط كما ذكرت انت ..

ربما من يعرف عنها شيئا ان يفيدنا

عموما .. سيناريو رائع .. وصيد حلو اخي الكريم .. بالتوفيق ان شاء الله

[fxcmtrad]

يمكن ان يحدث وخاصة ان السبب الرئيس المعلن لضغف الدولار مازال موجود ولا يجود شئ يفسر ما حدث من الارتفاع

[وهم وسراب]

ملاحظة اكثر من رائعةاتمنى لو جئت بها كتوقع قبل مدة لكانت استفادتنا منها لاتوصف

[Neil]

أخي أبو حسام...
شكراً على إبداء الإعجاب باللقطة و خصوصاً من صاحب نظرة ثاقبة مثلك....

أنا شخصياً أؤمن كثيراً بالدورات السعرية .
و خصوصاً زوج اليورو دولار ، فأنا أراه سهل الفهم و التوقع .

كما أرى أن كل زوج من الأزواج يحب تشكيلات معينة ..
فمنها ما يحت الإعادة و الدبل توب " كاليورو دولار "
و منها ما يحب تشكيلة الهيد أند شولدرز و يكررها ..
و منها .. و منها ,...

[Neil]

نعم يا أخي fxcmtrad فالدولار إندكس متوقع هذا العام أن ينزل إلى مستويات ال 75 بسهولة .

[Neil]

ملاحظة اكثر من رائعةاتمنى لو جئت بها كتوقع قبل مدة لكانت استفادتنا منها لاتوصف

أخي زياد ..

شكراً لك .. و لكني حتى الأن كما لو كنت صاحب فرضية ، أي أراقب السوق منذ أكثر من
شهرين كي أرى إن كان يحقق هذا السيناريو أم لا ..

و بعد الأسبوع التصحيحي الأخير تدعمت و جهت نظري هذه ..
لذلك إذا كان التاريخ يعيد نفسه فالآن هي فرصة الإستفادة .. ليس سابقاً
و خصوصاً إذا لم يتمكن السعر هذا الأسبوع من الكسر السفلي ل : 1.2970

[ماجد كو]

NO RESOLUTION SEEN FOR DOLLAR GLOOM



by Ashraf Laidi
1/3/2005, Forexnews.com




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The deterioration of the structural imbalances in the US economy combined with the US Treasury’s policy of benign neglect for the dollar, as well as the deepening quagmire in Iraq and the resulting erosion on the budget, have all maintained negative currents against the US currency. In a trade weighted-index of 6 currencies, the dollar has fallen 32%, 18% and 5% since January 2002, January 2003 and January 2004 respectively. In 2004, the performance of the US currency was composed of 3 parts, an 11% rise between January and early May reflecting expectations of higher interest rates following improved jobs figures and increasing inflationary pressures; a 4% decline between May and end of August in a combination of increased interest rates and mounting pre-election uncertainty; and an 8% drop from September until the end of the year on record trade deficit, waning foreign flows and eroding fiscal confidence following the reelection of the Bush Administration.

The Dollar’s 5 Culprits are Here to Stay; 1) Swelling trade deficit ; 2) Widening budget imbalance; 3) Treasury weak dollar policy; 4) Waning foreign flows; 5) US real rate interest rates to remain lower than average.

1. Record Trade Deficit Matters this Time
The US trade gap continued hitting record highs in 2004, accounting for an unprecedented 5.7% of GDP. Soaring oil exacerbated the rise in oil imports, as these made up 11% of total imports in autumn 2004, twice the share in January 2002. Despite the 30% drop in the dollar’s trade-weighted value since January 2002, the US trade deficit swelled over 80%. With the US importing approximately a fifth of the world's exports, and with US imports standing over 50% greater than exports, it would take more than a falling dollar to stabilize the swelling trade gap. Since 2001, imports averaged a monthly growth rate of 0.5% compared to 0.2% for exports. Should the trend continue, the trade deficit would surpass $60 billion in June 2005. Only in the unlikely event that US exports grow twice as much as imports such as 2% exports and 1% imports, will the deficit have more realistic ways of reversing. Short of a slump in US demand that would be only brought about by a US recession, US imports show no signs of retreating any time soon, thus maintaining the negative status quo in the trade gap.

2. Why the Budget Deficit Matters
The widening budget deficit hit a record $412.55 billion in fiscal 2004 following a record $377.14 billion in fiscal 2003. The fiscal profligacy of the current US administration and its negative impact on market sentiment was largely the cause of the renewed attack on the currency after the Nov 2 election outcome. The decision to extend the first term’s income tax and dividend tax cuts has also eroded any hopes of stabilizing the fiscal imbalance. Although the President’s re-election campaign ran on the promise to cut the deficit in half by the time he leaves office, prospects remain cloudy. At 3.6% of GDP, the 2004 deficit was proportionally smaller than those of the mid-1980s, which surpassed 5% of GDP. But revenues remain doubtful when the administration struggles to contain spending. Overhauling Social Security, for example, will bear considerable costs as the administration plans to borrow as much as $2 trillion over the next 10 years to transfer a portion of workers' payroll taxes into private accounts. Meanwhile, tax revenues are at 16% of GDP, the smallest in 4 decades.

The budget deficit is important to currency markets because it raises the risk of further swelling of government and household debt via higher interest rates. The argument goes as such; when US-bound foreign capital flows are struggling to cover the trade deficit, foreign investors require a higher rate of return to hold US assets, thus, necessitating higher interest rates especially when the dollar’s value is eroded. It is these higher rates that would exacerbate the already rising personal and government debt.

3. Benign Currency Neglect
The US Treasury’s weak dollar policy of the past 2 years has also accelerated the currency’s decline despite its touting of the strong dollar being in the US interest. Two clear examples of this; 1) the US ability to exclude any statements in the last two G7 meetings urging for stabilizing dollar decline underscores the US support for the falling greenback; 2) Treasury Secretary Snow’s insistence that the dollar’s value must be “decided by the markets” at a time when markets have shed over 30% off the currency’s value in trade weighted terms since January 2002, leaves markets no choice but to infer the satisfaction of the US administration with the dollar’s trend.

4. Foreign Disinterest
The accelerating escalation of the US trade deficit relative to US-bound foreign flows has given credence to the much feared question of “sustainability”. Although net foreign inflows have comfortably covered the trade deficit in the first 10 months of 2004, standing at over $700 billion compared to $500 billion for the accumulated trade deficit, the trend has eroded significantly in the second half of the year. In the first quarter of 2004, monthly trade inflows averaged $85 billion, twice as much as the average monthly trade deficit of $46 billion. But in Q3, the monthly average of foreign flows dropped to $62 billion while the monthly trade deficit pushed up to $52 billion. The trend grew worse in October 2004 when the trade deficit surpassed foreign flows at $55.5 billion compared to $48.1 billion. In other words, in Q1, each $1.00 of the trade deficit was financed by twice as many dollars in the form of foreign flows into the US. This ratio then fell to 0.87 cents in October. Such is an ominous sign of the US’ inability to finance the swelling deficit, a trend that is clearly highlighted in the chart below. As the US trade deficit continues to grow at its current pace, it is doubtful whether foreign investors will keep up with the rate coverage especially as they require higher rate of returns on their investments to offset the tumbling value of the US currency. A shortage of the foreign financing would only endanger the slide of the dollar as investors seek instruments in other currencies.

The other disturbing trend related to external deficit financing is the over-concentration of US asset class. As of October 2004, foreign holdings of US Treasuries made up 42% of total foreign holdings of US assets, compared to 0.42% in US stocks, with the balance in corporate bonds and agency bonds. This stands in contrast with -12% in Treasuries and 38% in equities in 2000. The over-concentration of US debt instruments (treasury, agency, corporate) by foreigners relative to corporate stocks highlights the riskiness of these instruments in the face of further Fed tightening at a time when US growth shows signs of peaking but not the twin deficits.

5. Real US Rates Still Low
The Fed’s cheap money policy of the first 6 months underscored the dollar’s unattractive yields relative to the rest of the world. And even when the Fed did raise interest rates by a total of 125 bps, the real level of the fed funds rate became barely above the level of annual inflation. Yet the rate hikes failed to boost the dollar mainly due to the escalating trade deficit, whose pace of growth has outweighed the rate of foreign inflows into the US, thus raising worries about the US ability to finance its record deficit. A poll of 60 US-based economists predict the US fed funds rate to end 2005 at an average of 3.40% from its current 2.25%, and the 10-year yield at 5.10% from its current 4.30%. Such a level of fed funds rate translates at a real rate of about 2.0%, a little lower than previous estimates of 2.50%. We expect see the fed funds rate to end the year at no more than 3.25-50% and the 10-year rate to finish at 5.25-30%.

FED & ECB: DIVERGENT MONETARY & CURRENCY POLICIES

When explaining the dollar’s drop, particularly against the euro, many overlook the impact of the divergent monetary and currency policies in the US and the Eurozone. Although the Federal Reserve has shifted towards a monetary policy of gradual tightening, i.e. taking back accommodation at a measured pace, the European Central Bank has maintained a monetary policy of relative easing, holding rates at 40-year lows since cutting them last in June 2003. The two central banks’ contrasting monetary policies have been offset by contrasting currency policies with the ECB allowing a strong euro to contain oil’s inflationary pressures and the US Treasury (and the Fed) encouraging a weak dollar. The ECB’s “tight” currency policy is mainly a result of the central bank’s explicit mandate to keep inflation at or close to 2.0%. These contrasting monetary/currency policies have largely facilitated the run-up in the EURUSD rate.

Considering these factors, it is not surprising to see why the ECB has not rushed to intervening but only resorted to talking down the euros’ rise. Yet, despite the anti-inflationary benefits of a strong euro, the ECB should start growing mindful of the impact on exports. Indeed, the average Eurozone nation derives nearly 50% of its total trade from the region, therefore is relatively shielded from the costs of foreign exchange changes. Nonetheless, slowing world growth and a soaring euro have already started to weigh on exports.

Eurozone exports growth slowed to 1.2% in Q3 q/q, down from 3.1% q/q in Q2 and 1.5% in Q1. The trends were easily attributed to the moves in the euro, which strengthened in Q1, dropped back in Q2 before soaring to record highs in Q3.

As for the question of intervention, it largely depends on the extent of the currency’s appreciation rather than solely on the absolute level of the currency. ECB officials have repeatedly echoed this message when they expressed concern with the “volatility” in the pair rather than worrying about a particular “target”. Thus, the ECB is more likely to step up verbal or operational intervention in the event that the euro hits $1.40 by next week, than if it reached it next month. When projecting likely targets of interventions, it is jut as important to consider the level as well as the time it takes for the level to be realized.

IRAQI ELECTIONS: NOT JUST A DATE

Iraq’s general elections scheduled on January 30 should bring their share of complications; both in the preceding 4 weeks and the ensuing months. Unlike the symbolic handover of power on June 30 by the Council Coalition Provisional Authority to a transitional government in Iraq whose importance largely depended on “getting it on schedule”, the January elections have much more at stake. Here is summary of the risks:

Sunni-Shia Feud to come to the fore. Although the escalating violence has been repeatedly attributed to Islamic groups and “thugs”, the “Sunni” card should not be discounted. Sunni’s minority composition in Iraq of no more than 20% of the population did not stop them from reinforcing their political majority over the past 50 years. Finally, Iraq’s 60% Shia population will finally get a wider political representation. The incoming elections are designed to produce a coalition of Shia dominated parties, making it the first Shia Muslim government in the history of the Arab world. Yet the escalating Sunni discontent isn’t about to dissipate any time soon. Iraq’s Sunni-based Association of Muslim Scholars boasting over 3,000 Sunni mosques has led the campaign to boycott the elections, calling for the elections to be postponed for six months. Thus, even in the event that the elections do take place on time and produce a Shia-led coalition, conditions will transition into a Lebanon-like protracted civil war, containing Islamic extremists, foreign fighters from Al Qaeda, loyalists to the Saddam regime/National Guard, ex-Baathists and common criminals. This would only require the replenishment of US troops at the expense of more human casualties deteriorating morale and further allocation of war spending.

Iraq’s Shia: Between Iran & the US. The Da'wa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) are the two major parties enjoying most considerable support of Iraq’s highest Shi'a religious authority. More interestingly, SCIRI and its pro-US leader Al Hakim have considerable ties to Iran—nation that is branded as the Axis of Evil. And in the backdrop of all this, Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani, Iraq’s most influential spiritual leader is carefully monitoring the political developments. Much to the dismay of many in Washington, all of this presents a disappointing loss to secular moderates. Even PM Allawi, the secular leader with much of the US fortunes and trust has not succeeded in forming a coalition slate with his own party. Thus, with key Shia figures backed by Iran and with the secularists’ role dwindling further, Washington will be at great pains of reconciling the end result with the intended objectives in Iraq.

Arab world cool to a Shia-led Iraq. A topic that is infrequently discussed is the Arab world’s reaction to Iraq’s political landscape. Baghdad’s Sunni Arab neighbors have pushed actively for Sunni participation. US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan are known for their aversion to a Shia-led government, especially with a backing from Iran. Such complications could pose further problems to the balance of power in Iraq as well as to the intra-Arab stability in the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Jordan and Syria).

Iraq’s Sunnis are not the only group calling for postponement. As many as 17 political parties have petitioned the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq to delay the elections for at least six months. Even current Prime Minister Ayad Allawi backed such a petition.

Since the military intervention in Iraq, as many as 1,100 US soldiers have been killed and nearly 20,000 Iraqi civilians have died according to identifiable news reports. Iraq’s elections may be the turn of a new page in Iraqi politics, but could well be a new tome in a long volume of ethnic violence, nationalist reverberations and endless bloodshed.

Distracted by a change in US monetary policy, soaring oil prices, US elections and a tumbling dollar, financial markets have largely ignored the escalation of violence in Iraq. But the constant calls for boycott, the escalating human casualties and the increased assassination attempts of key political leaders will bring the Iraqi question to the fore in the first half of January, creating the following lose-lose situation for the markets; an election on schedule would not only be stained with further bloodshed but could be deemed invalid if the Sunni population went on with its boycott. On the other hand, if the election is extended to the 6 months demanded by the Sunni and rest of parties, it would be a resounding sign of failure for the transitional government.

LOOKING AHEAD

Just like in 2004, we see the dollar entering a multifaceted trend which, underlined by a decidedly negative decline largely due to continuation of the themes of 2004. With both the trade and budget deficits accounting for more than 10% of GDP, and the US Administration showing no signs of containing the currency, speculators should be encouraged to build new dollar short positions, especially that these have been cut towards year-end. Meanwhile, with very slim prospects of any upside moves in Eurozone rates, Asset managers will further test the virtues of higher yielding, capital based, currency-driven instruments such as Eurozone-bonds.

We expect intermittent bouts of dollar bounces in the first quarter resulting from profit talking by speculators and asset managers, periodic but temporary declines in oil prices and emerging signs of further tightening measures from China. We expect China’s central bank to make another rate hike in mid Q1, which would pressure commodities such as metals, thus boosting the dollar to as high as $1.3100 against the euro and 107 against the yen. But the positive dollar impact from any China tightening will eventually run its course as that would pave the way for an eventual rebalancing of the yuan into a basket system of currencies, including the euro. The dollar weak story is here to stay.

Also contributing to intermittent dollar bounces are further signs of a peak in UK rates and a moderation in tightening from the Bank of Canada. UK interest rates stand at 4.75%, exactly at their 5-year average. Given the protracted slowdown in house prices and persistently benign inflation (below target), it is unlikely UK rates will rise above 5.0%. Faced with a rising EURGBP rate, the Bank of England can afford to live with a falling dollar, especially with further rallies in EURUSD lifting the EURGBP rate, targeting the upside near 72.50 pence from the current 71 pence.

In Japan, markets are bracing for the day when inflation turns positive. Last autumn, the Bank of Japan estimated that the nation’s 9-year deflation would end in Q1. Such an event very should prove crucial in affecting interest rate expectations for the ultimate lifting of the zero interest rate policy. Such prospects would be yen bullish, especially if a tightening is not considered as a premature decision to contain an already cooling economy. Speaking of premature decisions, Tokyo’s decision to roll back as much as 1.6 trillion yen in tax cuts introduced 6 years ago is seen with cautiousness by analysts. While this is far from the 9 trillion yen in tax hikes of 1997--which sent back the nation into a prolonged recession—the possibility of fiscal and monetary tightening could generate tremendous upside for the currency, thus calling 97 yen by year end.

The Bank of Canada will also have to further raise its real interest rate from the current 0.9%, given the current core annual inflation at 1.6% and the cash rate at 2.50%. With the economy having yet to regain full capacity, and strong oil prices sustaining a durable base at the $40 per barrel zone, we see room for real rates rising towards the 1.50% level, which is equivalent with nominal rates at 3.00-3.25%. The only obstacle for any tightening is an earlier than expected rally in the CAD past the 1.17 level. Nonetheless, with smaller chances for tightening in the event that USDCAD is dragged below 1.17 before end of Q1.

We expect the dollar’s secular bear market to continue throughout 2005 due to a continuation (if not a deterioration) of the aforementioned factors. Although we expect the Fed to raise interest rates by a full point, we see the structural deficiencies of the US economy, namely the twin deficits, overwhelming the advantages of higher US yields. The latest trend of monthly foreign capital flows failing to cover the monthly deficit will require foreign investors to demand higher rates of returns from US paper, thus necessitating a stronger dollar or higher US rates. Neither the dollar could deliver that option nor could real US interest rates increase sufficiently to compensate for external concerns considering the possible peaking in US growth.

January 3, 2005

ارجو ان تستفيدوا منه

تحياتي

[Neil]

شكراً أخي ماجد على هذه الإضافة
أجد انها من الأجدى أن تنشر في الرابط التالي الذي يحمل عنوان 2005 Forex Forecasts :
https://forum.arabictrader.com/t1568.html